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Experiments concerned with adaptation to freezing cold in snow huts (igloos) to be carried out under varying diets in order to establish whether adaptation to cold [German text says "Gewaehrung" gastritis diet purchase nexium 20mg online, i gastritis erosive cheap nexium 20 mg on-line. Why do you remember the date when the first experiments were made in the low-pressure chambers so well? The 22d of February- is my birthday and the tubercular patients gave a party for me. Ten prisoners were selected and were taken to the station as permanent experimental subjects; and they were told that nothing would happen to thdm. One day, however, Rascher told me the next day he was going to make a serious experiment and that he would need 16 Russians who had been condemned to death, and he received these Russians. Then I told Rascher that I would not help, and I actually got Rascher to send me away to the tubercular ward. On the next day when I returned to the station, Endres was already there and he said that two more, two Jews, would be killed. I left the station again, but I matched to see who would be taken for the experiments. I went to the place where he worked, and I was told that Endres had just taken the man away. I told Romberg that this was not a person who had been condemned to death, that this was a clear case of murder on the responsibility of Endres. Romberg went with me to see Rascher to clear the matter up, but it was discovered that Endres had put this man in the experimental car because he had refused to make a civilian suit for him. Rascher sent the man back; Endres went with him and remarked: "Well, then you will get an injection today. I n the meantime, Endres had brought a second man up, a Czech, whom I knew very well. Again it was Romberg together with me who talked to Rascher to stop this experiment or to inquire why a man like Endres was simply taking people who had never been condemned to death. Rascher went to the camp commandant, Piorkowski, who personally came to the station and Endres was transferred to Lublin immediately. And now I come to the subject: it was actually the day on which my comrade and I reached the decision that under all circumstances, no matter what happened, I would not remain at thi* Q. Now, before you continue with your story, I would like to put some specific questions to you. It is true, is it not, that concentration camp inmates were experimented on during these high-altitude experiments? About how many concentration camp inmates were subjected to these high-altitude experiments? I am asking you, Witness, when the high-altitude experiments ended, that is, when they were completed. During the course of June-maybe the beginning of July, the low-pressure chambers were taken away. And you state that between 22 February 1942 and the end of June, or the beginning of July 1942, approximately 180 to 200 concentration camp inmates were experimented on? I cannot say that with certainty but I think that approximately all nations were represented there; that is, all nations that were in the camp, mostly Russians, Poles, Germans, and Jews belonging to any nation. Now, will you tell the Tribunal how these experimental subjects were selecked 8 A. For those experiments, the people were brought into the experimental station straight from the camp, that is, from the blocks. Now, did they, to your knowledge, make any effort in the camp to secure volunteers for these experiments? That was because Rascher promised certain persons that they would be released from the camp if they underwent these experiments. Now, about how many of such volunteers would you say there were for the high-altitude experiments? Did these volunteers come one at a time, or did they come in a body, or just how did they present themselves to the experimental stations? Rascher moved around the camp quite a lot and on that occasion the inmates spoke to him. I n o the ~ words, the camp officials and Rascher and Romberg made no effortto find volunteers, did they? Now, other than these approximately 10 persons who you state presented themselves as volunteers, were all the rest of the experimental subjects simply picked out and brought in and experimented on?
Almost simultaneously gastritis symptoms during pregnancy 40 mg nexium for sale, this polarization received a second impulse 64 when parties and movements became heavily ideological under the influence of worldwide intellectual trends gastritis diet 10 buy generic nexium online. A sign of that ideologizing was the fact that parties and movements to a greater or lesser extent proposed complete models for society, and they were unwilling to admit any but the most minimal modifications, postponements, or negotiations of those models. Since, however, these movements and parties did not actually have enough political power to impose such models, the practical result of their becoming more ideologized was a heightened polarization. Nevertheless, political life continued to make its way within at least an apparent shared adherence to the democratic rules of the game. Most of the population supported democracy, despite the numerous and varied issues in dispute. In certain political sectors the notion that force was the primary and indeed only way either to change or maintain-as the case might be-the favored model was gaining ground. By the same token, these same sectors criticized and lost faith in democratic procedures, namely the electoral route to power, and in its institutions, such as parliamentary rule. Such tendencies were to be found on both the "left" and the "right," as they were conventionally called. For some sectors of the left, embracing a policy of armed struggle was largely related to the Cuban Revolution, which made the "armed path" paramount in the struggle to take power. Indeed, one of its most outstanding figures, Ernesto Guevara, whose ideological influence and personal following was enormous throughout Latin America, declared and argued that armed struggle was the only path. In his view, any other routes, such as democratic or electoral ones, political proselytizing, organizing to pressure for change, parliamentary approaches and so forth, were merely complements of armed struggle; otherwise they were sheer illusion. It carried out armed actions from underground and was working toward taking power through insurrection. It did not join the Popular Unity, and it underestimated the 1970 electoral campaign which was to end with the victory of the Popular Unity. Certainly the Socialist party officially adopted it at the Congress of Chill n (1967) and reaffirmed it in the Congress of La Serena (1971) when it was in power as part of the 65 Popular Unity. The majority elected to the Central Committee and the General Secretary firmly believed that armed conflict was inevitable. It is true that for more than thirty years the Socialist party had been fully involved in democratic politics. Moreover, even after 1967 there were strong tendencies within it in this direction. Yet it is also true that the political language and actions of the party brought it closer to the latter than to the old Socialist party. The picture would be neither complete nor fair if we failed to note that on the left and particularly in the Popular Unity there were other sectors that rejected the armed path either on principle or in view of the political and social conditions at that time (the "objective conditions"). However, during the later stages of the crisis (1970-1973), these sectors found themselves pushed aside, overwhelmed, and sometimes seduced and drawn in by those who argued that armed conflict was inevitable. Likewise some groups on the right either officially or in their actual behavior supported the use of weapons as a way of resolving the crisis, at least toward the end. One of these, the so-called "Tacna" group, which published a newspaper under that title, openly advocated a military coup. The same was true, in practice if not in theory, of leaders and activists of the Fatherland and Liberty Nationalist Movement, who were involved in the failed effort at a military uprising called the "tanquetazo" [abortive tank attack on La Moneda] on June 29, 1973. Later that year they were still preparing for a further attempt when the events of September 11 occurred. The remaining sectors of the right were not involved in any similar military action, including the decisive one. Nevertheless, within the right-although not all of it-there was always a mindset favorable to resolving certain problems (those of a social nature, for example, or the problem of communism) by means of force. Moreover, an incident such as the so-called "Schneider plot" in 1970 [murder of army commanderin-chief General Renй Schneider intended to provoke a coup and prevent Allende from taking office] and the post-September 11 behavior of most right-wing leaders seem to indicate that a considerable proportion of them and of their followers likewise favored a violent solution, at least in the final moments of the 1970-1973 crisis. We should also mention the regrettably unsuccessful efforts made by more moderate sectors to encourage compromise between the government and opposition, such as contacts sponsored by the Catholic church. The Cuban Revolution and the "Cold War" again contributed indirectly to hastening our crisis. These developments are directly related to the devastating economic crisis Chile underwent starting in 1972, which was an integral and very important part of the broader crisis culminating in 1973.
The grounds for that conviction are the following points: * the other people arrested at the supposed political meeting were not brought to trial gastritis and celiac diet cheap nexium 40 mg with visa, as would have happened had the official account been true gastritis diet natural treatment order nexium in united states online. He was kept in solitary confinement until October 12, when he was transferred to the jail in Illapel. From there he was taken to the La Serena Regiment and arrived there in the early morning of October 16. He was arrested September 12, by the Vicuсa police and taken to the police station there, and from there to the La Serena jail. Four days later he was transferred to the jail in Illapel where he was held until October 15, and was then taken to the La Serena jail. Soldiers arrested him on the job September 16 and took him to the La Serena Regiment and then to the local jail. He was arrested by police, taken to the Illapel police station and from there to La Serena. Police from Ovalle arrested him at his workplace and took him to the local police station and from there he was taken to the La Serena jail. Police from Ovalle arrested him at his home September 22 and took him to the police station. On October 1 he was arrested by police from Salamanca and taken to the local substation. He reported to the Ovalle police station September 12 in response to a summons by military edict. Rearrested on September 16, he was taken to the La Serena Regiment and from there to the local jail. He was taken to the jail in Illapel, where he remained until September 18, when he was transferred to the La Serena jail. Police from La Serena arrested him September 19 and took him to the police station and then to the jail in the city, where his family visited him. Upon receiving a summons he reported to the headquarters of the investigative police in La Serena on September 27. He was arrested and immediately taken to the regiment and then to the jail in the city. On September 14 he voluntarily reported at the Incahuasi checkpoint after being told that he had been summoned by authorities in La Serena. He was arrested and taken to the jail in La Serena and tried for violating the Law of Internal State Security. On June 26, 1975 after he had been executed by decision of the commander-inchief his sentence was lowered to 541 days. After being held for two days in the local police station he was taken to the Arica Regiment in La Serena. The official account issued by the local military authority refers to a war tribunal held October 16, which is said to have issued the death sentences for these fifteen prisoners, and notes that the tribunal that issued the sentence "came especially from Santiago. With regard to these killings, the Commission received a good deal of competent testimony that agreed on certain facts: the fifteen prisoners on the list were executed without any due process of law by government agents. The following items support that conviction: * Credible witnesses have testified on the sequence of events leading to the death of the fifteen prisoners: since almost no time passed between the moment when their cases were reviewed and the execution, a war tribunal could not have been conducted in accordance with the law. In fact, as was noted above, Roberto Guzmбn had been sentenced by a war tribunal to a five year sentence, which in 1975 was lowered to 541 days. Since, therefore, the accused had no chance to defend themselves, and the accusations do not appear on any document to which the Commission had access, this Commission has come to the conviction that the fifteen executions were a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible. Since it is established that he was arrested and was killed inside the La Serena Regiment grounds, the Commission came to the 393 conviction that Josй Rodrнguez was executed. Government agents are shown to have been responsible for a human rights violation by reason of these circumstances: * Taking into account the nature of the place he was being held, a military garrison which had every reason to be under heavy guard when these events took place, it does not seem likely that he would have tried to flee. The death certificate states that the cause of death was a "bullet wound," and that the place was the "Arica Regiment in La Serena. The Commission came to the conviction that Josй Rodrнguez was killed by government agents who gravely violated his right to life. The grounds for that conviction are as follows: * Documents prove that he was killed on the regiment grounds by a bullet wound, and thus it is reasonable to presume that army troops were responsible. He had been arrested by police from Illapel, and three days later he was taken to the jail in that city.
The Commission simply notes that these different and quite dissimilar aspects of civilian activity with regard to human rights did not bring about any significant positive effect noticeable today gastritis diet questionnaire buy nexium 20mg lowest price, except the rescue of a few dozen people who were being persecuted gastritis diet order nexium without prescription. These actions were certainly worthwhile, but they were minimal compared to all those who were executed, disappeared, and so forth. An equally laudable yet wholly unsuccessful effort was that of some jurists who supported the military regime. Aware of its weakness in the area of human rights, they tried to provide constitutional protection for the rights of the person which were then being violated. Such an effort was made on three occasions, more elaborately each time: in the "Declaration of Principles" (1973), in the Constitutional Acts (1976), and in the new Constitution (1980). In closing let us note that the political activity of those civilians who supported the regime, whether on behalf of human rights or anything else, was stymied from the outset: despite their ties of generation, ideas, and friendship, they were powerless to form an organization that could promote such action by uniting, coordinating, and representing them. Whatever label might have been given to such an organization, in practice it would have been a party, and the regime simply did not trust any parties that might be formed, even those that might be set up to support it. Although previously they may not have been aware of the matter or given it much thought, they now saw the immense harm it might cause, not so much to its victims as to the regime and to the country. Indeed, during the 1977-1979 period many people thought that the situation was on its way to substantial improvement. To close this section we note some further possible reasons for this development, some based on evidence and others on conjecture. This lack of discipline is believed to have facilitated "independent" operations, the emergence of satellite groups and so forth, resulting in activities that were out of control. The Communist party (probably as a result of pressure by activist members and leaders who were underground in Chile and in opposition to its veteran representatives, all of whom were of course in exile) gave up its policy of seeking to reach power through peaceful means, and opted to use violence against the military regime. This policy was sketched out in several official documents beginning as early as 1980. Their armed actions and acts of terrorism also led to loss of life, as described in this report. Such groups infiltrated the "national protests" (considered in a special section in this report) trying to lead them to violence so as to bring the country and the regime, they said, to the point of "ungovernability. However, it can be stated with certainty that, during the final years of the military regime, the political structure that had been established by the enactment and implementation of the 1980 Constitution did not eliminate the national problem of serious and constant violations of human rights (although the frequency and numbers of victims admittedly declined). Indeed, the 1978 amnesty, which its civilian promoters may well have regarded as the closing of the book on a now superseded problem, ultimately seemed to entail impunity for the past and to promise impunity for the future. Installation of the junta According to the 1925 Constitution, government functions were to be exercised by independent, separate bodies exercising oversight over one another. In his manner the Chilean institutional order expressed the principle that abuses by government bodies in carrying out their functions are to be prevented by dividing, imiting, and controlling their powers, and that those who violate these bounds must be held accountable within the legal system. Such was the order that the 1925 Constitution established; indeed it was the same order that had been in effect, with some variations, since the Constitution of 1833. When viewed from this perspective, what happened starting on September 1, 1973, constituted a profound disruption of the Chilean governmental system. On that date the military junta stated that it was assuming "supreme rule over the nation with the patriotic commitment to restore the Chilean way of life, justice, and institutional order that have been shattered. Some looked to Article 60 of the 1925 Constitution, which states that "a citizen with title of President of the Republic of Chile administers the state and is the supreme head of the nation. The same could be said about the competency the president shares with the Congress-and with the electorate should there be a plebiscite-to act as one of the members of the constituent power. When it is charged with reforming the constitution, certain requirements must be met, such as high percentage quorums in both legislative houses (Senate and Chamber of Deputies). Nevertheless, it subjected the decentralized agencies of the administration to that office19 and during September and October 1973 it sent its supreme decrees there to be registered but not to have their legality approved. Functioning of political power the junta exercised constituent and legislative power by issuing decree laws. In any case all the junta members had to be in agreement in order to issue constitutional and legal norms.
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