WHY focus on Civil Service reforms?
A permanent civil service is crucial for reconciling the conflict between short-term political pressures on elected governments and the slow progress of adopting sound public policies. However, a dispassionate examination of our record reveals that our civil services have failed to promote long-term public good. We face a dire predicament: the Weberian concept of a rational-legal bureaucracy, applying laws and rules impartially, has not been realised. Wass’s argument of the civil service safeguarding the long-term public good as a counterbalance to short-term political pressures has been proven false.
And the functional efficiency and professional competence expected of a meritocratic, politically neutral, trained civil service has not been attained. Fierce competition in the recruitment of central and All-India services ensure that spirited and competent individuals join said public services. However, tardy service delivery coupled with inefficient administration shed light upon the prevailing incompetence of the services. A deeper analysis reveals four major shortcomings:
- Lack of specialisation in civil services results in officers having to handle diverse subjects without adequate exposure or expertise.
- Assured rise in service irrespective of competence and delivery in turn leaves no incentive to perform well.
- Monopoly of IAS and a few privileged services in all senior government positions leaves little opportunity for the best and brightest in the nation to serve the nation out of passion and commitment.
- Officials are inadequately empowered to deliver, and are often chosen arbitrarily and transferred frequently, further compounding the issue of poor service delivery and leading to a culture of demotivation and apathy.
HOW can we reform?
Our administrative body and infrastructure responds well to clearly defined objectives, availability of resources, and enforced accountability. India’s successful management of elections, disaster management, and VIP visits are testimony to our bureaucratic efficiency, when clear intent, unambiguous lines of authority, and definitive accountability are present to regulate efficient service delivery. However, the failure in delivering basic amenities as well as fundamental services such as healthcare, education, crime investigation and land records, highlight the stark disconnect between authority and accountability except in ad hoc functions.
Despite having impressive achievements to its credit, our bureaucracy’s evident failure calls for a complete restructuring of the present culture. Some eminent reforms include:
- Every officer must gain domain expertise in one area of administration after the initial years of field postings (say 12 years), and should subsequently serve the remainder of her service only in those selective sectors with expertise.
- A mechanism must be established to compulsorily retire officers after 15, 20, 25, and 30 years of service following a thorough performance and potential review. This provision should be included in the Civil Services law with new appointments explicitly stating a tenure of 15-20 years, with further continuation in government service subject to intensive performance reviews.
- For senior positions, officials should be selected through competitive processes, drawing from various sectors such as civil service, academia, management, private sector, and civil society. Appointees should serve a five-year term, with the option for reappointment for another term by mutual agreement. Efforts should be made to create an inclusive and welcoming administrative environment, inviting capable individuals from diverse backgrounds to contribute to improving public systems.
- Executive agencies should be established for all field agencies, ensuring security of tenure, clearly defined expected outcomes, adequate resources and authority, as well as effective performance evaluation and accountability mechanisms, similar to ISRO & BARC.